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Abstract
While barriers to trade between EU-15 and accession countries have been completely
abolished on May 1
st 2004, other integration impediments remain to exist in the enlarged EU.
These will steadily decrease within the next years, e.g. by new member states joining the
Schengen Treaty and Euro area. A significant outstanding integration step is the liberalisation
of labour mobility between EU-15 and new member states which will be realised not later
than 2011. In this context it is often argued that the free movement of labour could worsen
labour market problems in the former EU-15, especially in regions neighbouring the new
member countries. This paper provides an assessment of the impact of enlargement on labour
markets in the German-Polish border region. As a starting point for the analysis, current
labour market conditions and income disparities in the German-Polish border region are
analysed. Furthermore, the paper summarises relevant implications of migration theories and
gives an outlook on the development of factors determining cross-border labour migration in
the German-Polish border region. Finally, different estimates of migration and commuting
potential affecting labour markets in the German-Polish border region until 2020 are
discussed.
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1  Introduction
Although barriers to trade between new and old member states of the EU have been
completely abolished on May 1
st 2004, other integration impediments remain to exist in the
enlarged EU. These will steadily decrease within the next years, e.g. by new member states
joining the Schengen Treaty and Euro area. A significant outstanding integration step is the
liberalisation of labour mobility between EU-15 and new member states which will be
realised not later than 2011. In this context, it is often argued that introducing the free
movement of labour within EU-25 could worsen labour market problems in the former EU-15
countries. Most probably, large income disparities will continue to exist during the next
decades among EU-15 and most new EU member states. Disparities in income and overall
living conditions are expected to constitute incentives for migration and commuting from East
to West.
1 Especially labour markets in regions neighbouring new EU countries will be
affected if commuter flows will increase.
Pessimistic expectations regarding labour market effects of immigration and commuting from
Eastern Europe gave rise to temporary provisions for the free movement of labour in the
enlarged EU, e.g. in Germany and Austria which are bordering accession countries. These
regulations are opposed to the former EU integration process. In the past, the intensification
of cross-border labour market relations was an explicit objective of EU integration policy
supported by the formation of Euregios, e.g. in the French-German and the Dutch-German
border region.
2 Altogether, different from former rounds of EU enlargement, currently free
labour movement between new and old member states is considered as a challenge and not a
chance of the European integration process. This paper aims at contributing to the discussion
on labour market effects of enlargement with assessing the potential impact of enlargement on
labour supply in the border regions of East Germany neighbouring Poland. It deals with the
question whether it is reasonable to expect a huge increase of labour supply in these regions
which could result in a reduction of wages and increasing unemployment among the domestic
labour force in case labour mobility between Germany and Poland is liberalised. Thereby
overall demographic trends are taken into account. This is an aspect often neglected when
dealing with labour market issues in border regions. Nevertheless, demographic trends play an
important role for development of labour supply and might strongly differ among regions.
Therefore, the spatial dimension of population development has to be considered when
discussing labour market issues of the German-Polish border regions.
In the following, current labour market conditions and income disparities in the German-
Polish border region are analysed. Furthermore, determinants of commuting and migration
and their development in the German-Polish border area are discussed. Finally, different
scenarios of migration and commuting potential affecting labour markets in the German-
                                                
1 See European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2004a, 2000 b).
2 See Alecke/Untiedt (2003), p. 2.4
Polish border region until 2020 are presented. Within the scenarios different assumptions
regarding the development of one of the most driving forces behind migration and commuting
– i.e. income disparities - are considered. The paper concludes with an assessment of the
labour market impact of Eastern enlargement on German border regions neighbouring Poland.
2  Cross border labour markets - Initial Situation in the German- Polish Border Region
2.1.  Regulations on cross-border labour mobility
3
Temporary provisions regarding the free movement of people between Poland and Germany
Germany opted for temporary provisions postponing the free movement of labour between
Poland and Germany. Within the legal framework of The Treaty of Accession of 2003, Annex
VII specific regulations regarding free movement of people exist between Germany and
Poland. For a period of two years after accession, the principle of free movement of workers
is set out, i.e. existing national or bilateral provisions are maintained. This means that Polish
workers still need a work permit in order to get access to the German labour market. It is,
however, not approved to introduce more restrictive regulations after the accession. Before
the end of two years the Commission has to be informed whether the special provisions will
be maintained. If no notification takes place Regulation No. 1612/68 will be applied, which
means free movement of workers is no longer limited. Otherwise with consent of a qualified
Council majority national or bilateral provisions can be maintained for another three years. In
case of severe disturbances of the national labour market the period can be extended up to
seven years after Poland’s accession.
4 The same exemptions can be applied in case of German
nationals seeking for employment in Poland. Moreover, family members of a worker who
resides in Germany for a period of less than 12 months at the day of accession, are not entitled
to unhindered access to the German labour market for the above stated interim period.
Additionally, in order to mitigate possible disturbances of the service sector Germany is
entitled to deviate for the same period from the principle of free trade in services in the fields
of construction services, industrial cleaning services and services of interior decorators
offered by companies based in Poland. Regarding the freedom of establishment of firms no
restrictions are prevalent.
5
                                                
3 The paper only deals with labour migration and not with other kinds of migration between Germany and
Poland.
4 See Bundesministerium des Inneren (2004).
5 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2004).5
Frontier commuter agreement between Germany and Poland
According to Paragraph 6 Sentence 1 of the German Anwerbestopausnahmeverordnung
(ASAV) Polish frontier commuters are able to obtain an unrestricted work permit in Germany
within a border region of 50 km. Necessary conditions are that Polish nationals reside in their
home country in which they are not entitled for social welfare benefits. Moreover, they are not
allowed to stay for more than two days per week in Germany. As a legal document a permit of
residence for foreigners is not necessary. Instead, a special commuter card valid for two years
is issued.
The above-mentioned regulations are meant to protect German labour markets from expected
increases in labour supply due to migration and commuting from Poland. However, the
agreements on commuting and migration are only temporary. Free movement of labour
between Germany an Poland will be realised not later than 2011.
2.2.  The German-Polish border region
In the empirical analysis at hand, two regional levels are considered. Firstly, the so-called
border region bases on NUTS III regions for Germany (Kreise and kreisfreie Städte) and
NUTS IV regions for Poland (Powiaty and Miasta na prawach powiatu) (see Table 1 and
Map 1). Kreise and Powiaty directly located at the border as well as Cities surrounded by
these Kreise and Powiaty are considered to constitute the German-Polish border region. To
corresponding regions we will refer as border-Kreise respectively border-Powiaty. Secondly,
we investigate the German Bundesländer (NUTS I) and the Polish Voivodships (NUTS II) to
which border-Kreise and border-Powiaty belong. Additionally, the Bundesland Berlin is
considered which is an important destination for immigrants from Poland and hence should be
considered when dealing with labour market issues of EU enlargement. Furthermore, we
include the Voivodship Greater Poland in the analysis.
Map 1. Around here6
Border-Kreise share 4.6 % of the German territory and border-Powiaty cover 4.4 % of the
Polish area (see Table 1). Approximately 3.6 million people have been living in the German-
Polish border region in the year 2002.




Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania Greifswald, kreisfreie Stadt Ostvorpommern,
Uecker-Randow
Brandenburg Cottbus, kreisfreie Stadt, Spree-Neiße, Frankfurt  /
Oder, kreisfreie Stadt, Uckermark, Barnim, Oder-
Spree, Märkisch-Oderland
Saxony Görlitz, kreisfreie Stadt, Niederschlesischer
Oberlausitzkreis, Löbau – Zittau
Poland
Border-Voivodships Border-Powiaty
West Pomerania V. (Zachodniopomorskie) goleniowski,  gryfinski,  kamienski,  mysliborski,
policki, m. Szczecin, m. Swinoujscie
Lubusz V. (Lubuskie) gorzowski,  slubicki,  sulecinski,  m.Gorzow
Wielkopolski, krosnienski odrzanski, zarski
Lower Silesia V. (Dolnoslaskie) zgorzelecki
Greater Poland V. (Wielkopolskie)
Per capita income strongly differs among German and Polish regions. In the year 2001, per
capita income in border-Bundesländer range from 16,806 € (Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania) to 22,531 € (Berlin) and are roughly 3.5 to 5 times as high as per capita income in
Polish Voivodships. However, when considering disparities in purchasing power the income
gap among German and Polish regions appears to be much smaller (see Table 2). Measured in
purchasing power parities (PPP), per capita income in Mecklenburg-Western Pomeranian,
Brandenburg and Saxony account for approximately 72 - 73 % of the average over EU-15 and
Accession Countries in the year 2001. Corresponding values for border-Voivodships range
between 40 and 46 %. Hence, when considering purchasing power parity the income level in
German regions appears not even to be twice as high as in Poland. However, an exception is
Berlin having a per capita income close to 100 % of the average over EU-15 and accession
countries.7






















   Source: EUROSTAT.
The German-Polish border region is marked by serious labour market problems. High growth
rates in the Polish regions in the second half of the 1990s did not give rise to a recovery of
labour markets in the Polish border region. Table 3 illustrates that unemployment in the EU
has significantly decreased in the EU-15 and Germany between 1998 and 2002 while it
increased in Poland. On the contrary, unemployment increased in the Voivodships and
German Bundesländer close to the German-Polish border. In the year 2002, unemployment
rates in the Bundesländer bordering Poland strongly deviated from the German and EU
average, ranging from 17.6% in Berlin to 23.6% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The
same holds for the border-Voivodships – except Greater Poland - having unemployment rates
which are significantly higher than in Poland on average. In the considered regions,
unemployment is lowest in Berlin, Lubusz V. (17.7%) and Brandenburg (19.8 %). Within the
rest of border-Bundesländer and Voivodships, unemployment rates are higher than 20%.
Altogether, unemployment does not suggest that many East-German border regions offer
strictly better job opportunities than neighbouring Polish regions. Unemployment rates are
very similar in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Silesia V. and West Pomeranian V.8
Table  2: Unemployment rates in the German-Polish border regions, EU-15,
Germany and Poland, 1998 and 2002
Region 1998 2002
EU 15 9.9 7.5
Germany 9.6 8.5
  Berlin 14.2 17.6




  Saxony 17.5 20.3
Poland 9.9 19.9
  Lower Silesian V. 11.2 23.7
  Lubusz V. 11.5 26.3
  Greater Poland V. 7.7 17.7
  West Pomeranian V. 12.6 22.4
Source: EUROSTAT.
3  Future Development of Labour Supply in the German-Polish border region
The development of regional labour supply depends on several factors: the overall
demographic trends given by fertility and age structure of the population, migration and
commuting as well as labour participation rates. In the following we will summarise the
results of regional population forecasts for Germany and Poland to assess how overall
population development will impact labour markets in the border region. While overall
demographic trends can be forecasted accurately, the estimation of migration and commuter
flows is comparatively difficult. This goes back to the fact that labour mobility depends on a
wide variety of factors for which future development cannot be predicted for sure. In order to
evaluate the regional importance of future migration and commuting we summarise
determinants of migration and commuting emphasised in migration theories and give an
assessment concerning their probable development in the German-Polish border region until
2020. The section closes with scenarios regarding migration and commuter potential affecting
labour supply in the German-Polish border region.
3.1.  Demographic Trends
Overall demographic trends for Germany as well as for Poland indicate population decline
and increasing population shares of upper age groups until 2020. According to current
forecasts the Polish population will decline by 2.5 % and the German population by 0.8 %
until the year 2020. Furthermore, for Germany and for Poland population forecasts on a9
regional level exist which allow projections of the population development in the German-
P o l i s h  b o r d e r  r e g i o n  a s  w e l l s  a s  i n  t h e relevant German Bundesländer and Polish
Voivodships. (see Table 3). These figures indicate that population development will strongly
differ among corresponding regions. Population will decline in Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania and Saxony while Brandenburg and Berlin will – in contrast to the overall
demographic trend in Germany – exhibit positive population growth rates. This result can
predominantly be explained by Berlin being an attractive destination for migration within
Germany and from abroad. Especially Brandenburg, which is surrounding Berlin, is expected
to realise population increase released by processes of suburbanisation.
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 Polish border  region 1,375.4 -3.5
German-Polish border region 3,598.2 -3.2
Source:  Polish Statistical Office (2003); Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR 2003), own
calculations.
According to Polish population forecasts, Greater Poland will be the only border-Voivodship
in which population will increase during the period under consideration. Greater Poland
benefits from being a preferred destination of intranational migration because of its
comparatively good economic performance.
Altogether, the considered population forecasts imply a population decline by 3.2 % for the
German-Polish border region until 2020. Furthermore, the age structure of the population in10
the German-Polish border region will significantly change during the forecasting period.
Increasing average age of the population is indicated by the development of people older than
60 years (see Figure 2). The population share of this age group will increase in all considered
regions whereby these changes will be more pronounced in the Polish part of the border
region than in the German one. Until 2020, the share of inhabitants older than 60 years will on
average increase by 5 percentage points in the German regions and by 11 percentage points in
the Polish regions. According to the population forecasts, the population share of the
considered age group will amount to 29.7 % in the German regions and 27.6 % in the Polish
regions in the year 2020.
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Source:  Polish Statistical Office (2003); Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (2003), own
calculations.
Population ageing can be expected to strongly impact on labour market conditions in the
German-Polish border region. The change of the age structure of the working population will
affect the production process. Simultaneously the population of employable age will strongly
decrease until 2020 (see Figure 3) – by almost 11 % in Poland and about 3.8 % in Germany.
Compared to the German average, the decline of population of employable age will be
relatively strong in the border-Bundesländer except for Berlin. For example, Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania presumably has to face a decline of the population of employable age of
approximately 16 %. Concerning labour supply, we find the same trends in the border-
Voivodships as in the neighbouring German Bundesländer whereby the decline in the
population of employable age is more pronounced in Poland. For three of the border-11
Voivodships a corresponding decline of more than 12 % is projected. Altogether, pressure on
labour supply in the border region will ceteris paribus be reduced by demographic
development trends.
Figure 3: Decrease of population of employable age between 2003 and 2020, in %
Source:  Polish Statistical Office (2003); BBR (2003); own calculations.
3.2.  Determinants of Migration and Commuting
3.2.1 Implications of Economic Theories
Besides natural population development, migration and commuting are important
determinants of the development of labour supply. Traditional neo-classical models predict
that the liberalisation of labour mobility will release a relocation of labour between regions
marked by disparities in labour market conditions.
6 Labour will move from low wage regions
to high wage areas until no more interregional wage disparities exist for labour of the same
skill level.
7 Harris/Todaro (1970) developed a two sector model of rural-urban migration with
urban unemployment going back to an institutionally determined minimum wage. According
to the model, rural-urban migration proceeds in response to expected earnings. Labour will
migrate towards urban regions as long as the wage level in these regions – the high income
regions – weighted by the risk of being unemployed surpasses the wage level of other regions.
As a consequence of immigration, unemployment will rise making it less attractive to migrate
                                                
6 See Niebuhr/Stiller (2004) for an overview on implications of economic theories concerning integration and
cross border labour markets.


























from rural to urban regions. Altogether, traditional migration theories imply that workers will
migrate towards regions where wages are comparatively high and unemployment is relatively
low (Massey et al. 1993, Molho 1986).
More advanced migration theories go beyond considering labour market conditions as the
only determinant of labour migration. In the human capital approach
8 migration is considered
as an investment decision depending on wage level in the potential destination, qualification,
age of the worker and migration costs including direct migration costs (information, search
and travel costs) as well as indirect migration costs (social and physical costs).
Furthermore, migration theories point to the relevance of personal networks in making the
migration decision. Key elements of migration networks are intense relations among persons
in regions of origin and destination (Straubhaar 2000). Some migration theories subsume
migration determinants in push factors in the region of origin (e.g. low standard of living,
high unemployment, insufficient social security system, high taxes, bad environmental
conditions, bad infrastructure) and pull factors at work in the region of destination (e.g. high
standard of living, low unemployment, good social security system, low taxes, good
environmental conditions, good infrastructure, networks).
9
Spatial distance between country of destination and origin influences the migration decision
due to affecting migration costs. Regarding implications for labour markets in border regions,
frictional effects of distance and transaction costs are highly relevant. Labour mobility is not
free of costs and there is no perfect information on labour market opportunities.
10 Ravenstein
(1889) formulated in his laws on migration that migration predominantly takes place over
short distances. Schwartz (1973) discusses economic and other factors that form the
underlying adverse effects of distance on migration as implied by the negative distance
elasticity of migration flows. Corresponding migration determinants are sorted into two
groups: (1) increasing (with distance) costs and (2) diminishing (with distance) information.
Empirical studies imply that the probability to migrate between two regions declines as
distance between them increases because migration costs rise and assessing potential
migration gains becomes more difficult.
11 The dampening effect of distance indicates that
workers located in border regions should have a relatively high incentive to migrate to
neighbouring countries. Costs of migrating to neighbouring countries are comparatively low
for individuals in border regions which have, due to spatial proximity, advantages in gathering
information on the foreign labour market. Moreover, social costs should be relatively low due
                                                
8 The seminal paper is Sjastaad (1962).
9 See Fischer/Straubhaar (1994) pp. 75-100.
10 See Janssen (2000).
11 See Tassinopoulos (1999).13
to short travel times for visiting families abroad.
12 However, significant border impediments
might increase transaction costs and information deficits, reducing labour mobility between
neighbouring regions along national borders relative to mobility among domestic labour
markets. In case migration costs and commuting costs matter, workers will only have an
incentive to commute or migrate if the wage differential compensates for commuting costs.
Altogether, migration theories imply that urban regions offering favourable labour market
conditions and attractive living conditions might generally have an advantage in attracting
labour. Furthermore, it seems to be more probable that those regions already having a
relatively high share of foreigners will rather be the destination of immigrants from abroad
than regions with lower shares of foreigners in the workforce. According to migration theories
the concentration of migrants in border regions is probable if these regions offer favourable
living conditions, good labour market opportunities and contacts for network migrants.
Summarising the above-mentioned considerations, one could conclude that the potential for
cross-border migration is above average in border regions – for immigration as well as for
emigration. Labour market integration between border regions might also be promoted by
cross-border commuting which depends on distance by nature. Literature on commuting is
compared to empirical and theoretical research on migration rather sparse. However,
determinants of labour migration can be transferred to commuting if one considers cross-
border commuting not as an interregional labour market decision.
13 Such an approach is in
early stages of labour market integration, like in the German-Polish border region, very
reasonable. Hence, the number of potential in-commuters in border regions will be the higher
the better the opportunities for finding a job and the higher wage rates are. Furthermore,
empirical studies prove population density to be an important determinant for commuting.
Taking together arguments from migration theory and empirical studies, densely populated
border regions offering good labour market opportunities are attractive destinations for labour
from abroad while rural areas cannot be considered as preferred regions of commuters. Hence,
labour market effects of in-commuting might only be pronounced in some of the East-German
regions located along the Polish border.
                                                
12 See Schwartz (1973).
13 See Alecke/Untiedt (2003), p. 1.14
3.2.2 Migration Incentives in the German-Polish border region
Migration theories imply that interregional migration and also commuting can to a large
extent be explained by economic factors, i.e. interregional disparities in unemployment and
wage rates.
Regarding unemployment rates, East German border regions appear on average to be less
attractive destinations for in-commuters and migrants from Poland compared to other parts of
Germany. This holds especially for rural areas facing serious economic problems. Differently,
wage disparities among German and Polish regions seem to constitute an important migration
incentive for Polish workers. However, in the course of Poland’s integration in the EU, the
importance of income disparities as an migration incentive will most probably lose
importance. Current developments with regard to GDP per capita measured in Purchasing
Power Parity already indicate the narrowing of per capita income between Germany and
Poland. It will be decisive for the amount of migration and commuting from Poland how fast
Polish per capita income will converge towards the German income level.
In order to illustrate possible scenarios regarding future income disparities between border-
Bundesländer and -Voivodships, we made two calculations on the development of regional
per capita income. In Scenario 1 it is assumed that currently low growth rates of GDP per
capita in East Germany will increase and reach the average level of Western European
Regions in the year 2010. For the Polish Regions it is assumed that the high economic growth
observed in the second half of the 1990s will continue until the year 2010. Afterwards growth
rates are assumed to be half as high as at the end of the 1990s. This scenario implies the
following average annual growth rates: Lower Silesian V. (5.7 %), Lubusz V. (4.3 %), West
Pomeranian V. (5.1 %), Greater Poland V. (7.0  %), Berlin (3.4 %), Saxony (4.6 %),
Brandenburg (4.6 %) and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (4.7 %). Scenario 2 bases on the
assumption that future growth rates correspond to average growth rates over the years 1995 to
2000. On average, GDP per capita measured in PPP grew at a rate of 3.6 % in East German
regions during that period of time while average growth rate was 5 % for the EU and 7.6 % in
Voivodships bordering Germany. Thereby regional growth rates distinctly differed: Lower
Sileasian V. (7.3 %), Lubusz V. (5.6 %), West Pomeranian V. (6.6 %), Greater Poland V.
(9.0 %), Berlin (1.9 %), Saxony (4.2 %), Brandenburg (4.2 %) and Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania (4.4 %).
Figures 4 and 5 summarise the results of the growth scenarios. In scenario 1, significant
income gaps between German and Polish regions will continue to exist with exception for
Greater Poland V. But on average, the income gap between German and Polish regions
narrows. Under the relevant assumptions the – compared to EU-15 average – relatively low
income level will still exist within the border area. Therefore this scenario suggests that
German border regions will most probably attract migrants from Poland, due to income gaps15
but also due to spatial proximity between Poland and Germany. However, income gaps will
still constitute an incentive for commuting from Poland to Germany as well.



























Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations.
Based on Scenario 2 one arrives at different conclusions. In this scenario migration and
commuting incentives strongly lose importance within the border area. Instead, Greater
Poland V. would become the region with the highest per capita income in the border region. It
should be mentioned that this scenario indeed appears to be relatively unrealistic.16



























Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations.
Within this scenario, two of the Polish border-Voivodships would not have lower per capita
incomes than the German border-Bundesländer. Furthermore, Polish regions would improve
their relative income position in relation to the EU average. Altogether this scenario regarding
income development seems not to very plausible. On the one hand it can be expected that
economic development will – at least in some parts of East Germany – stabilise.
14 On the
other hand the growth process of Poland from 1995 to 2000 will most probably slow down.
To sum up, assessing future relevance of migration between Germany and Poland is a difficult
issue since the development of migration incentives is unknown itself. For coping with this
methodological problems, estimations of migration potential have to consider different
development scenarios. Altogether, most probably future development of income disparities
among Polish and German border regions will range between Scenario 1 and 2 implying
decreasing incentives for migration and commuting from Poland to Germany. Also forecasts
regarding the development of population of employable age suggest that pressure on East
German labour markets from Poland will be comparatively low – due to strongly decreasing
population of employable age in Polish border-Voivodships. Furthermore, population of
employable age will also decrease in East Germany. However, we cannot judge on how
demographic trends will impact labour market conditions in East Germany. Whether the
reduction of labour supply will support decreasing unemployment in East Germany depends
also on future labour demand which we did not analyse here. Finally, it depends on the
development of migration and commuting costs – going back e.g. to cultural differences,
language barriers and infrastructure capacities – how cross-border migration and commuting
will develop in the German-Polish border region.
                                                
14 For a recent overview on estimations of migration potential see Bruder (2003).17
3.3.  Migration and Commuting Potential
Several studies provide estimations for migration potential from accession countries towards
EU-15 taking into account especially economic migration motives, i.e. income disparities. But
according to our knowledge, estimations of the spatial distribution of Polish immigrants in
Germany do not exist. However, this is an important aspect regarding labour market issues of
German regions bordering Poland. Therefore we derived estimates for regional immigration
potential based on forecasts for migration among Germany and Poland on the national level.
For assessing migration potential directed towards German regions proximate to Poland we
assumed that the spatial pattern of immigration from Poland to Germany observed in the past
will remain in future. Migration potential is calculated for Bundesländer and Voivodships
since corresponding data is not available for lower regional levels.
Within Europe, migration between Poland and Germany constitute the most important flow of
binational migration – measured in absolute numbers – during the 1990s. From the year 1991
up to the year 2001 about one million people migrated from Poland to Germany and about
850.000 migrated from Germany towards Poland. Altogether, 12 % of total emigration from
Germany went to Poland and 10 % of total immigration to Germany originated from Poland.
During that period of time, 14 % of all Polish migrants chose border-Bundesländer as their
destination, whereby Berlin attracted 7 % of all immigrants from Poland while 4 % migrated
to Saxony, 2 % to Brandenburg and 1 % to Mecklenburg-Western Pomeranian. The regional
distribution of emigrants from Poland in Germany is reflected by the share of the Polish
population in the Bundesländer. More than 1 % of Berlin’s total population is Polish which is
significantly above the German average (see Figure 6) while the population share of Polish
inhabitants is relatively low in the rest of the border-Bundesländer. Relatively strong
migration from Poland towards Berlin can on the one hand be explained by Berlin being
Germany’s largest agglomeration offering a large labour market and on the other hand by
network migration from Poland. Altogether, labour market impact of free labour mobility
between Germany and Poland will be felt ceteris paribus the more strongly in receiving
regions the higher immigration and incommuting from Poland is.18













Source: German Statistical Office.
Not only the regional destination of Polish migrants but also their regional provenance is
relevant for the development of labour market conditions in the German-Polish border region.
Commuting pressure towards East Germany will be the lower the smaller the population of
working age in Polish regions neighbouring Germany is. Therefore, emigration from Polish
Voivodships to other regions than the border-Bundesländer reduces ceteris paribus the
pressure on labour markets in East Germany’s border regions. During the 1990s 6 % of the
Polish emigrants came from Lower Silesian V., 2 % from Lubusz V. as well as from West
Pomeranian V. and 1 % from Greater Poland V.
Generally, estimated migration potentials caused by EU enlargement distinctly differ among
studies depending on assumptions, i.e. regarding the rate of convergence among EU-15 and
accession countries. Nevertheless, it is a common result of migration forecasts that they
predict net migration from Poland to Germany until the year 2020. However, estimated
migration potential in the course of enlargement distinctly differs among studies depending on
the particular assumptions, especially regarding the rate of convergence among EU-15 and
accession countries. For our study we rely on the models chosen by the German Institute for
Economic Research (DIW 2000) and Flaig (2001). Both studies assume free movement of
labour among Germany and Poland right from the beginning of Poland’s EU accession – an
assumption which is not in accordance with the present. But the assumption regarding free
movement of labour does not significantly alter the results regarding migration potential. The
result of DIW (2000) imply that the liberalisation of labour movement some years after
Poland’s EU accession change the estimated migration potential only at the margin.19
In the above mentioned studies, per capita income disparities among Germany and Poland are
considered as the driving force for migration from Poland to Germany. DIW (2000) assumes
that income disparities among Germany and Poland decrease at an annual rate of 2 %. Flaig
(2001) considers two scenarios. In one scenario he assumes that income disparities among
Germany and Poland will remain constant. And in a second scenario he assumes that Poland’s
annual per capita growth rate will exceed Germany’s at 2 %.
Table 4: Assumptions on Development of Income Disparities between Germany and
Poland
Development of income disparities Migration potential from
Poland to Germany until 2020
Scenario 1
(Flaig 2001)
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita in Poland 2









Decreasing income disparities among Germany
and Poland by  2 % per year
403,000
Based on the studies summarised in Table 4, we derived three scenarios for migration
potential affecting the German-Polish border region. Thereby, the estimations for total
migration between Germany and Poland are broken down to the regional level. The
assumptions concerning regional destination and provenance of migrants are the same in all of
the scenarios and correspond to the migration patterns observed during the 1990s. Figure 7
summarises the results of our calculations.
According to Scenario 1, migration from Poland to Germany will amount to 1.305.000 people
until 2020. Estimations based on Scenario 2 forecast a migration potential of 1.729.000
people. And Scenario 3 implies migration from Germany to Poland of 403.000 people. Total
emigration from Poland to the German part of the border region ranges from 49.000 people
(Scenario 3) to 224.000 people (Scenario 2). The results imply that 39.000 people (Scenario
3) respectively 177.000 people (Scenario 2) come from regions in the Polish part of the border
region. The impact of immigration from Poland on regional labour supply distinctly differs
among the border-Bundesländer. Estimated immigration potential from Poland to
Mecklenburg-Western Pomeranian and Brandenburg is comparatively low while for
Brandenburg and especially Berlin significantly higher migration inflows from Poland are the
outcome of our calculations. Furthermore, it is estimated that emigration figures strongly
differ between the border-Voivodships. While the reduction of labour supply due to migration
losses will be comparatively low in Greater Poland V., e.g. Lower Silesian V. Other regions
are expected to face distinctly higher population losses due to migration towards Germany.
Altogether, the estimated migration figures imply that migration between Germany and
Poland will not be the dominant determinant of labour market developments in the considered20
period of time. Broken down to an annual level, additional labour supply caused by
immigration from Poland can be assessed to be small in relation to current size of the labour
force in the border-Bundesländer.



































Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Source: Own calculations, based on DIW (2000) and Flaig (2001).
In the literature it is argued, that cross-border commuting will be more important than
immigration for the development of labour supply in the German part of the border area since
commuting is expected to increase due to Poland’s EU accession. Most probably, the
relevance of commuting for regional labour supply will strongly differ among regions in the
border region. Gravity models imply that densely populated German regions offering a
relatively large labour market will attract relatively more commuters from Poland than rural
areas. Labour market impact of commuters from Poland will be comparatively small in less
densely populated German regions neighbouring Poland. To sum up, for German cities
located close to the border neighbouring densely populated Polish regions in-commuting will
be comparatively high. Instead, labour market impact of commuters from Poland can be
expected to be low in rural and less densely populated regions in East Germany.21
Based on a gravity model, Alecke/Untiedt (2001) estimate that commuting will increase
labour supply in cities located in the German border region by 2 to 4 %. Applied to the
population forecasts of the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning
(2003)
15 one can calculate the commuting potential directed towards German cities located in
the border region for the year 2020 (see Figure 8). According to the calculations, in-
commuting will be more intense in the Southern part of the border region (e.g. Dresden and
Görlitz), where regions are relatively densely populated, than in the northern part (e.g.
Stralsund and Greifswald). However, most probably Berlin’s labour market will be most
strongly affected by commuters from Poland due to being a highly agglomerated region
offering a large labour market with many employment opportunities.
Figure 8: Commuter Potential


















Source: Own calculations, based on Alecke/Untiedt (2001) and BBR (2003).
a Including in-commuters from Czech Republic.
Also calculations for the German Raumordnungsregion near to the border imply different
relevance of in-commuting from Poland for regional labour markets between the northern
(e.g. Western Pomerania, Uckermark-Barnim) and southern part (Oberlausitz-
Niederschlesien, Elbtal/Osterzgebirge) of East Germany (see Figure 9).
                                                
15 BBR (2003).22
Figure 9: Commuter Potential direct towards Raumordnungsregionen close to the



































































































































Source: Own calculations HWWA, based on Alecke/Untiedt (2001).
The estimations presented in Figure 8 and 9 can, for several reasons, be considered as
constituting the upper limit for migration potential. This is due to the fact, that the calculations
base on migration coefficients corresponding to commuting between regions in East and West
Germany. Most probably, the propensity to commute between Polish and German regions will
be lower due to existing language and cultural barriers as well as due to deficits in cross-
border infrastructure. Furthermore, the calculations base on the assumptions that per capita
income of German regions will continue to be seven times as high as in neighbouring Polish
regions. Currently, average income and wages disparities among Germany and Poland are
already much lower assumed by Alecke/Untiedt (2001). E.g., average annual wage in
manufacturing was only 4 times as high in Brandenburg than in Lubusz V.
16 If wage
disparities between East-Germany and neighbouring will continue to decrease in the course of
convergence commuter potential will be lower than implied by Figures 8 and Figures 9. Also
relatively high unemployment in the larger part of East Germany stands against high
commuter pressure towards East Germany from Poland.
17
According to the above mentioned models, total emigration from Poland to the German part
of the border region ranges from a total of 49,000 to 224,000 people within the considered
period of time. These figures correspond to a share of 0.7 respectively 3.2 % of the population
of employable age in border-Bundesländer in the year 2020. Furthermore, estimations based
on gravity models imply that in-commuting to German cities in the border region might
increase labour supply in these regions by a rate of 2 % to 4 %. These figures can be
considered as the upper limit for migration and commuting potential due to the above
mentioned factors reducing migration potential. Furthermore, these results also suggest that
                                                
16 See Dascher (2003).
17 See Hönekopp (2002).23
the impact of commuting might be more important for labour markets in the German-Polish
border region than the impact of migration from Poland.
4  Conclusions
We analysed the question, whether it is reasonable to expect a huge increase of labour supply
in East Germany’s border regions after Poland’s EU accession. Future development of labour
supply in German regions close to Poland depends on the overall demographic development,
the regional migration balance and commuter inflows. However, regional economic
development can be considered to be decisive for attracting migrants and commuters since
driving forces behind labour mobility are the income level and labour market opportunities.
The level and development of migration and commuting costs will importantly influence the
development of cross-border labour market relations between Germany and Poland.
Concerning the impact of demographic trends on labour supply, population forecasts imply
that the number of persons in employable age will significantly decline in the border region
during the next years. With a reduction of –14 %, the decrease of labour supply will be more
pronounced in the Polish than in the German part of the border until 2020. Altogether, it can
be assumed that demographic developments tend to reduce the migration potential from
Poland to Germany. The same conclusion holds with respect to probable development of
income disparities between Polish and German regions. How migration incentives that base
on wage disparities will develop, depends on the speed of income convergence in the
German-Polish border region.
To sum up, it is very probable that the EU accession of Poland will influence labour supply in
Germany’s regions bordering Poland. Regarding the quantitative impact of migration and
commuting several scenarios exists. Which of these will become a reality decisively depends
on the rate of income convergence between German and Polish border regions. However,
most scenarios imply modest migration figures. Altogether, it can be expected that labour
supply in the German-Polish border region will decline significantly until 2020 due to natural
demographic factors. Nevertheless, within specific regions labour supply will increase in the
course of this development. Most probably, especially highly agglomerated regions, like
Berlin, offering a wide variety of employment opportunities will attract migrants.24
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